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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
KENNETH GLENN ROBERTS, : Case No. 910164 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction is provided by Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-2-2(3)(i) (jurisdiction over "appeals from the district 
court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Is Mr. Roberts entitled to present a compulsion defense to 
charges of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault by a 
prisoner? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue is a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah 
1991) . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will 
be relied upon, and are contained in the body of the brief or 
Appendix 1: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 (1991) 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 (1991) 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-103.5 (1990) 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-302 (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-302 (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Roberts was originally charged with aggravated 
kidnapping and aggravated assault by a prisoner (R. 6-8).! 
Prior to trial, defense counsel subpoenaed witnesses and 
documents from the Department of Corrections for trial (R. 20, 
33-40, 63-79). The Department of Corrections moved to quash the 
subpoenas arguing that the subpoenas were not served personally, and 
did not give sufficient advance notice to the busy and important 
Corrections employees (R. 42-62). The hearing on this motion was 
held five days before trial was scheduled to begin (R. 19, 41). The 
attorney for Corrections indicated that the Department did not 
intend to subvert Mr. Roberts' defense, but simply required adequate 
notice and legal service of the subpoenas (T. 3-4). 
1. The district court pleadings file will be referred to 
as "R."; the transcript of the hearing held on January 17, 1991 will 
be referred to as flT.M; the transcript of the hearing held on 
March 8, 1991 will be referred to as "T.2". 
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At the hearing on the motion to quash, the prosecutor 
argued in support of Corrections' motion to quash the subpoenas, 
despite the fact that Corrections had filed and argued the motion to 
quash through one of Corrections7 private legal staff. The 
prosecutor argued that under the rules and the constitution, without 
some foundational showing, Mr. Roberts was not entitled to the 
testimony of Corrections employees (T. 7). The prosecutor argued 
that the evidence sought in the subpoenas was irrelevant to the case 
(T. 7). The prosecutor recognized that Mr. Roberts was planning to 
present a compulsion, or justification defense, and concluded that 
Mr. Roberts should not be allowed to "put on his little circus act 
in front of the jury." (T. 7-8). 
Defense counsel noted that this is a criminal case 
involving two first degree felonies, and that the Department of 
Corrections employs the victim and controls all of the witnesses to 
the events at issue (T. 9). She indicated that the subpoenas were 
necessary because Corrections had not responded to discovery 
requests concerning Mr. Roberts' case (T. 13). 
Defense counsel indicated her intent to present numerous 
specific examples of Mr. Roberts' efforts to seek administrative 
relief from threats to his physical safety, and argued that denying 
Mr. Roberts the opportunity to examine the witnesses from 
Corrections would jeopardize his rights to a fair and 
constitutionally protected trial (T. 15, 18). 
The trial court quashed the subpoenas because they were not 
served personally on the Department of Corrections employees, and 
because the subpoenas were not served sufficiently in advance of 
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trial (T. 19-20). 
The trial court then ruled that Mr. Roberts was legally 
precluded from raising a defense of compulsion (T. 19-20). The 
trial court's ruling relating to Mr. Roberts' inability to present 
the defense was as follows: 
I am inclined to agree with Mr. Skordas' position 
on relevance of this testimony. I don't think 
the defense of compulsion is a viable defense as 
a matter of law in this case. I don't think the 
law is if you are being mistreated at the prison 
you are therefore justified in taking a hostage. 
That's just not the law. This statute was made 
for a situation where someone is threatened. If 
you don't commit this crime, if you don't wait 
for me in the get-away car, then I will shoot 
you, that kind of compulsion. Not the kind of 
compulsion we are talking about here. I think 
the testimony of these witnesses would be 
irrelevant. That defense is not available as a 
matter of law and I am not going to let you put 
on that evidence. 
I am just — even if you wanted to 
re[-]serve them [the subpoenas], I am just not 
going to make this a trial of the Department of 
Corrections. The issue here is going to be did 
he commit the crime or didn't he, and the 
subpoenas will be quashed. 
After a continuance, Mr. Roberts entered a plea of guilty 
to one count of aggravated assault by a prisoner (T.2 4-8; 
R. 81-87). This plea was explicitly conditioned on Mr. Roberts' 
appeal of the trial court's ruling barring his defense to the 
criminal charges (T.2 3, 5, 7; R. 80, 81). 
Following the entry of this plea, the trial court sentenced 
Mr. Roberts to a term of five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison, to run concurrently with Mr. Roberts' preexisting sentences 
(T.2 9; R. 88-89). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1982, Mr. Roberts, while on parole, committed several 
crimes and seriously injured Ms. LaDawn Prue.2 After a criminal 
prosecution, Mr. Roberts was convicted of several first degree 
felonies and returned to the prison. 
As a result of Mr. Roberts' crimes against Ms. Prue while 
he was on parole, intense scrutiny was brought to bear on the parole 
policies and the Department of Corrections. The Department of 
Corrections was sued, and numerous employees of the Department were 
fired. 
Because of the consequences to Corrections and the entire 
parole system stemming from Mr. Roberts' crimes while he was on 
parole in 1982, Mr. Roberts has been at a special risk while in the 
prison. He has filed numerous administrative complaints, repeatedly 
seeking safety from several serious and specific threats to his 
safety, to no avail. 
Mr. Roberts was compelled to take the prison guard hostage 
in order to obtain his own safety. 
2. The facts underlying Mr. Roberts' defense are found in 
the argument of defense counsel, at pages 14 through 18 of the 
transcript. The record of Mr. Roberts' intended defense is not more 
detailed for two reasons: 1) defense counsel was unable to obtain 
records and information from the Department of Corrections necessary 
to the preparation of Mr. Roberts' defense (T. 13); and 2) defense 
counsel was not notified that the hearing on Corrections' motion to 
quash the subpoenas would encompass the viability of the compulsion 
defense, which intended defense had been discussed with the 
prosecutor and trial court without objection for months prior to the 
hearing on the motion to quash (T. 21). 
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The following facts underlying the charges against Mr. 
Roberts are alleged in the information: 
On March 26, 1990, in the Uinta II Facility 
of the Utah State Prison, Draper, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, defendant Kenneth Glenn Roberts 
threatened Correctional Officer Joe Hughes with a 
sharpened eight-inch steel rod fashioned into a 
knife (shank) and informed Correctional Officer 
Joe Hughes that he was being taken hostage by 
defendant, an inmate lawfully incarcerated at the 
Utah State Prison for conviction of a first 
degree felony. 
Correctional Officer Joe Hughes stated that 
defendant further threatened his life with the 
above described weapon by holding it close to his 
head and other vital parts of his body. 
Correctional Officer Joe Hughes believed his life 
to be in danger and was held hostage by defendant 
for a period of approximately two and one-half 
hours. 
...[D]efendant told Correctional Officer John 
Irons to refrain from entering the area where 
Correctional Officer Joe Hughes was held hostage 
or the latter would be killed. Defendant also 
told Correctional Lieutenants Taylor and Rowzee 
that he demanded to speak with Utah Department of 
Corrections Executive Director Gary DeLand and 
Mr. Deland was the only person with whom 
defendant would speak. If defendants demand was 
not met, Correctional Officer Joe Hughes would be 
killed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Every criminal defendant is entitled to defend against 
criminal charges. In forbidding Mr. Roberts to present his defense, 
the trial court violated some of the most fundamental rights 
provided by the Utah and Federal Constitutions. 
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The compulsion defense is applicable in this case, where 
Mr. Roberts contends that he was compelled to kidnap a prison guard 
because the Department of Corrections has failed to respond to and 
has exacerbated the unique, specific and imminent threats to 
Mr. Roberts' safety. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE UTAH AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 
ENTITLE MR. ROBERTS TO 
PRESENT HIS DEFENSE. 
In ruling that Mr. Roberts was legally barred from 
presenting a compulsion defense, the trial court overlooked 
Mr. Roberts' fundamental constitutional rights to present a defense, 
which rights are afforded to all criminal defendants. Mr. Roberts' 
rights to present a defense are explicitly protected by Article I 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution. This Court has also recognized 
the Due Process section of the Utah Constitution as a protector of 
Mr. Roberts' rights to present a defense. State v. Harding, 635 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1981) (citing Article I section 7). 
The Federal Constitution has also been interpreted as 
guaranteeing the rights to defend against criminal charges. See 
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) ("Whether rooted 
directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or 
in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a 
- 7 -
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'") (citations 
omitted); Morris v. Slappy. 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) ("Of course, 
inconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing 
to enforce constitutional rights of an accused: when prejudicial 
error is made that clearly impairs a defendant's constitutional 
rights, the burden of a new trial must be borne by the prosecution, 
the courts, and the witnesses; the Constitution permits nothing 
less."). 
II. 
THE COMPULSION DEFENSE 
APPLIES IN THIS CASE. 
The statutory compulsion defense is not limited to 
particular crimes. Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-302 provides, in 
part, as follows: 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense 
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct because 
he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened 
imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him 
or a third person, which force or threatened 
force a person of reasonable firmness in his 
situation would not have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by 
this section shall be unavailable to a person who 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places 
himself in a situation in which it is probable 
that he will be subjected to duress. 
This Court has recognized that the compulsion defense may 
be raised in cases involving crimes at the prison. E.g. State v. 
Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986) (compulsion is a valid defense to a 
charge of escaping from the prison). While the compulsion defense 
must be narrowly drawn in prison cases because life in prison is 
inherently dangerous and coercive, the defense is available to 
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prison inmates who face serious, imminent, specific threats to their 
physical safety. Id. at 633-635. See also People v. Lovercamp, 118 
Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974) (discussing evolution of common law, from 
opinions refusing to allow compulsion defense in any prison cases, 
to opinions allowing the defense in narrow circumstances).3 
A helpful discussion of the application of the compulsion 
defense to a prison kidnapping case appears in State v. Little, 312 
S.E.2d 695 (N.C. App. 1984). There, three prison inmates held 
prison employees hostage for over three days, demanding press 
coverage of their grievances concerning prison conditions, and 
demanding to be transferred to a different prison. Id. at 696 (N.C. 
App. 1984). In appealing their kidnapping convictions, the 
defendants contested the trial court's ruling that the defendants 
could not raise a compulsion defense based on general prison 
conditions. Id. at 697. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
3. In State v. Tuttle. 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986), this Court 
adopted the following common law limitations on the compulsion 
defense in prison escape cases: the defendant must be faced with a 
specific imminent threat of serious bodily injury, there must be no 
time for complaints to authorities or a history of futile 
complaints, and the defendant must report to authorities once the 
coercion justifying the escape abates. Id. at 634-635. The common 
law limitations on the compulsion defense in escape cases would 
probably require some modification in kidnapping and assault cases. 
See State v. Little, 312 S.E.2d 695, 698 (N.C. App. 1984) (court 
recognizes that common law limitations on compulsion defense in 
escape cases may require adjustment in kidnapping cases). The trial 
court could combine necessary elements from Tuttle with elements 
found in other common law defense cases. E.g. Bird v. Municipality 
of Anchorage, 787 P.2d 119, 120-121 (Alaska App. 1990) ("To 
establish the necessity defense the defendant must show that (1) The 
act charged was done to prevent a significant evil; (2) there was no 
adequate alternative; (3) the harm caused was not disproportionate 
to the harm avoided.11). 
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upheld the trial court's ruling, noting that the defendants had 
never claimed that they personally faced any specific threats, had 
never claimed any personal connection to events discussed in prison 
records subpoenaed by the defense, and had never examined prison 
officials to demonstrate that the defendants had made complaints to 
the prison administration. Id. at 698. The appellate court also 
upheld the trial court's order quashing the subpoenas of prison 
records, because the defendants had failed to make a threshold 
showing that they were faced with specific threats and had no 
effective opportunity to seek redress through the prison 
administration or the courts, id. at 699. 
In contrast, Mr. Roberts' compulsion defense is focused 
exclusively on specific threats to his own personal safety, on his 
own prison records, and on the Corrections employees who have 
personally failed to respond to his repeated and specific requests 
for relief. 
Under the Utah and Federal Constitutions, Mr. Roberts 
should be allowed to develop and present his defense. See Point I, 
supra. When Mr. Roberts is able to present evidence in support of 
the compulsion defense, the trial court should instruct the jury on 
that defense.4 
4. See State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981) ("It 
is ... axiomatic that where the defendant has asserted a defense to 
justify or excuse the criminal charge, and where there is a 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support it, the viability of the 
defense then becomes a question of fact and the jury should be 
charged regarding it. Where, however, there is no reasonable basis 
in the evidence to support the defense or its essential components, 
it is not error for the trial judge to either refuse to instruct the 
jury as to the defense, or to instruct them to disregard it."). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order barring 
the presentation of Mr. Roberts' compulsion defense, and remand this 
case to the trial court so that defense counsel can prepare and 
present Mr. Roberts' defense. 
Respectfully submitted this FT) day of September, 1991. 
Bk66KE C. WELLS 
attorney for Mr. Roberts 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
Attorriey for Mr. Roberts 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General/>s Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of September, 1991. 
EiilZAMTH HdlltBROOK 
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DELIVERED by 
this day of September, 1991. 
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APPENDIX 1 
TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, section 10 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general 
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall 
consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior 
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. 
In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. 
In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find 
a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived 
unless demanded. 
Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among 
the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when 
the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice-President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the 
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any 
of the male inhabitants of such State, being 
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the 
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or 
Representative in Congress, or elector of President 
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or 
military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United 
States, or as a member of any State legislature or 
as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall 
have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against 
the same or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds 
of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United 
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred 
for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned. But neither the United States nor any 
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against 
the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and 
void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-103.5 provides: 
76-5-103.5. Aggravated assault by prisoner. 
(1) Any prisoner not serving a sentence for a 
felony of the first degree, who commits aggravated 
assault is guilty of a felony of the second degree. 
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a 
felony of the first degree who commits aggravated 
assault is guilty of: 
(a) A felony of the first degree if no 
serious bodily injury was caused; or 
(b) A capital felony if serious bodily 
injury was intentionally caused. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-302 provides: 
76-2-302. Compulsion. 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when 
he engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was 
coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent 
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third 
person, which force or threatened force a person of 
reasonable firmness in his situation would not have 
resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this 
section shall be unavailable to a person who 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places 
himself in a situation in which it is probable that 
he will be subjected to duress. 
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason 
of the presence of her husband, to any presumption 
of compulsion or to any defense of compulsion except 
as in Subsection (1) provided. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-302 provides: 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if 
the person intentionally or knowingly, without 
authority of law and against the will of the victim, 
by any means and in any manner, seizes, confines, 
detains, or transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a 
shield or hostage or to compel a third person 
to engage in particular conduct or to forbear 
from engaging in particular conduct; or 
(b) To facilitate the commission, 
attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
or 
(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to 
terrorize the victim or another; or 
(d) To interfere with the performance of 
any governmental or political function; or 
(e) To commit a sexual offense as 
described in Part 4 of this chapter. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the 
result of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is 
mentally incompetent or younger than sixteen years 
and the detention or moving is accomplished without 
the effective consent of the victim's custodial 
parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis 
to the victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the 
first degree punishable by a term which is a minimum 
mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15 years 
and which may be for life. 
